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PENGURANGAN AMARAN KESELAMATAN PALSU 
MENGGUNAKAN RANGKA-KERJA KUALITI AMARAN PENCEROBOHAN 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Tesis ini mengkaji rekabentuk dan perlaksanaan rangka-kerja yang mempersiapkan 
amaran-amaran keselamatan dengan metrik-metrik yang disahkan, memperkayakan 
amaran-amaran keselamatan dengan metrik-metrik tersebut dan akhirnya, 
menyeragamkan amaran-amaran tersebut dengan satu format yang dipersetujui agar 
sesuai digunakan oleh prosedur-prosedur penganalisaan amaran di peringkat tinggi. 
Rangka-kerja ini dinamakan “Rangka-kerja Kualiti Amaran Pencerobohan” (IAQF) dan 
tujuan utamanya adalah untuk menambahbaik pengurangan amaran keselamatan 
palsu dalam bidang pengesanan pencerobohan. Satu analisa ke atas penyelesaian-
penyelesaian sedia ada untuk mengurangkan amaran-amaran palsu menunjukkan 
yang mereka tertumpu sama ada pada peringkat penggera atau peringkat 
penganalisaan. Merubah atau menyesuai penggera-penggera mungkin membantu 
mengurangkan bilangan amaran-amaran tetapi kita berisiko untuk terlepas pandang 
serangan-serangan sebenar yang dikenali sebagai negatif yang palsu. Pada peringkat 
yang lain, menyerahkan tugasan untuk menapis amaran-amaran palsu pada peringkat 
penganalisaan mungkin tidak juga berkesan. Pertama, kerana informasi yang berkaitan 
amaran-amaran tersebut tidak lengkap membuatkan sebarang pilihan efektif pada 
peringkat ini sukar dan hasilnya pada kebiasaannya tidak tepat. Kedua, amaran-
amaran dalam jumlah yang amat besar mungkin mendominasi masa pengiraan untuk 
memperbaiki amaran-amaran tersebut sebelum sistem dapat melaksanakan tugasan-
tugasan utama iaitu pengurangan amaran-amaran palsu. Oleh itu, persiapan data yang 
teratur perlu sebelum amaran-amaran dianalisa. Dalam kajian ini, kami melihat 
masalah ini dari perspektif pengurusan informasi di mana masalah ini adalah 
disebabkan oleh kualiti data amaran-amaran yang rendah. IAQF yang mengadaptasi 
prinsip kualiti data yang dipanggil TDQM dicadangkan di mana proses-prosesnya 
 xii
terdiri dari penakrifan, pengukuran, penganalisaan, dan penambahbaikan. IAQF telah 
dilaksanakan pada peringkat awal prosedur-prosedur analisis amaran untuk 
mempersiapkan dan menambahbaik kualiti data amaran-amaran tersebut. IAQF 
adalah bercirikan kebolehan untuk mengesahkan amaran-amaran menggunakan 
sumber informasi yang berkaitan, memperkayakan amaran-amaran dengan metrik-
metrik kualiti data, dan menyeragamkan amaran-amaran menggunakan format IDMEF, 
satu format data yang dipersetujui untuk mempersembahkan amaran-amaran.  
Kelebihan pendekatan ini adalah hasilnya yang boleh terus digunakan oleh prosedur-
prosedur penganalisaan iaitu perkaitan, perlombongan data, dan mesin pembelajaran. 
Kami telah menunjukkan bahawa dengan melaksanakan prinsip kualiti data terhadap 
pengurangan amaran palsu, kami telah berjaya mengurangkan amaran-amaran palsu 
antara 10 hingga 50%, dan mempersiapkan amaran-amaran dengan informasi 
berkaitan tambahan untuk kebaikan penganalisaan di peringkat tinggi. 
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INTRUSION ALERT QUALITY FRAMEWORK FOR 
SECURITY FALSE ALERT REDUCTION 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates the design and implementation of a framework to 
prepare security alerts with verified data quality metrics, enrich alerts with these metrics 
and finally, format the alerts in a standard format, suitable for consumption by high-
level alert analysis procedures. This framework is called “Intrusion Alert Quality 
Framework” (IAQF) and its main aim is to improve false alerts’ reduction in intrusion 
detection area. An analysis of existing solutions to reduce false alerts shows that they 
focus either at the sensor-level or at the analysis-level. Tuning or customizing the 
sensors may help reduces the number of alerts but we risk missing real attacks known 
as false negative. On the other extreme, leaving the tasks to filter false alerts at the 
analysis stage may not be effective either. First, is because incomplete contextual 
information about alerts may make any effective decision at this stage difficult, and the 
outcome to be most likely inaccurate. Second, the sheer size of alerts may dominate 
the computational time of cleaning raw alerts prior to performing the core task of 
reducing false alerts. Thus, a proper data preparation at low-level stage nearer to the 
data source is needed prior to the alert analysis. In this research, we look at this 
problem from the information management perspective where the problem is due to the 
alerts’ low data quality. IAQF that adapts a data quality principle called TDQM is 
proposed where the processes included are definition, measurement, analysis, and 
improvement. IAQF is implemented at the low level stage of alert analysis procedures 
to prepare and improve the data quality of the alerts. IAQF features the ability to verify 
alerts using resource contextual information, enrich them with data quality metrics, and 
standardize them using IDMEF format, a standard data format to present IDS alerts. 
The advantage of this approach is that the output can be directly consumed by analysis 
procedures, which are correlation, data mining, and machine learning. We 
 xiv
demonstrated that by applying data quality principles towards false alerts reduction, we 
managed to reduce false alerts in the range of 10 to 50%, and prepared the alerts with 
extra contextual information to benefit the high level analysis. 
 1
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Data quality management has been practiced to solve low data quality problem in 
information systems of organizations such as business (English, 1999), healthcare (Berndt 
et al., 2001), and WWW (Naumann, 2002). This problem exists most of the time in 
information systems as a result of incorrect entered, incompletely stored, inaccurately 
produced, or outdated data. This issue is severe especially if the data are very large in 
volume, as spotting and filtering inaccurate data use a lot of resources and are usually 
costly. Hence, a proper data quality management is needed to control the quality of the 
produced and stored data. Deployment of data quality management at strategic level, such 
as during the initial stage of data production may reduce costs and the resources needed 
to process data at the high-level stage, such as data analysis and data mining (Pyle, 
1999).  
 
Low data quality scenario also affects Information Communication Technology 
(ICT) security field, specifically in the intrusion detection area. Security analysts in typical 
organizations that implement ICT security have been bombarded with huge amount of 
security alerts or logs, generated by security sensors, like Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS), firewalls, and routers. In the context of this thesis, security alert is an alarm, a log, or 
a warning report, triggered by signature-based IDS sensors when an attack signature is 
identified. The generated IDS alerts, not only normally are huge in volume, but also lack 
contextual information, and contain low quality data. Therefore, in this research, we 
studied the effect of applying data quality management towards these alerts. The 
immediate result of this research is to improve the low data quality issue in IDS, by 
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producing high data quality alerts as input for the high-level analysis, so that false alerts 
are reduced.  
     
This chapter reviews the low data quality alert in IDS, and proposes solutions for 
the problem. In Section 1.2, the problem statement is presented. In this section, we detail 
out what factors contribute to low data quality alert as well as the problems with the current 
solutions. Section 1.3 proposes the solution, states the research objectives, and provides 
the scope of the work. Then, Section 1.4 lists out the terminologies while Section 1.5 
details out the main contributions. Finally, Section 1.6 describes the thesis outline. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement: False Alerts in Intrusion Detection 
Although the purpose of an alert is to warn security analysts when intrusion occurs, 
sensors have their own weakness that is producing a lot of false alerts such as false 
positives and noises. This is IDS’s traditional problem. According to Northcutt et al. (2003), 
false alerts are triggered as a result of sensors’ signature rules that are too general. 
Signatures are purposely not constructed with rules that are too specific to avoid false 
negative. Rules that are too specific will miss potentially malicious packets because 
attacks launched by intruders are constantly evolved from time to time to avoid detection. 
This attack development can be done by crafting the packets. However, signatures that 
are too general cause sensors to accept all packets that match the signatures and produce 
alerts that might be false. Because of this, sensors generate thousands of alerts that are 
benign where destination hosts are not vulnerable to the attack. Knowing this drawback, 
intruders may craft the packets that purposely launch fake attacks that trigger large 
amount of benign alerts and paralyze sensors from detecting real attacks. To make the 
condition worse, this scenario is directly proportionate to the number of sensors deployed 
in a network. Security analysts’ attention is often diverted to respond to thousands of 
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generated false alerts with low possibility to succeed while true alerts take a long time to 
be identified, or worse, might just be ignored. This is because sifting through these alerts 
to extract the true ones is a very time consuming task. This false alert problem deteriorates 
the IDS basic function that is to detect intrusions and immediately warn security analysts 
by producing alerts.  
 
Beside this phenomenon, another problem that contributes to low data quality 
alerts is IDS sensor outputs that are not standardized. Different types of sensors produce 
alerts in various forms that make alert analysis difficult. Most organizations apply defense-
in-depth strategy where more than one security devices like IDS and firewall, are deployed 
in the network. Some organizations might also install more than one type of IDS sensors 
such as host-based, network-based, signature-based, or anomaly-based IDS. The purpose 
of deploying different types of sensors is to rely on other security devices in case one of 
them fails to produce any alert. In order to benefit from this defense-in-depth practice, the 
outputs from these devices need to be correlated. Thus, standardization is needed to 
increase data quality of the alerts to help the correlation process.   
 
Currently, a lot of high-level alert analysis systems developed, have been directly 
or indirectly solving the IDS false alert problem discussed before by implementing analysis 
methods such as aggregation, correlation, data mining, and machine learning. At this level, 
the analysis methods are implemented mainly for the purpose of identifying true alerts, 
understanding attack scenario, or making critical security decisions. These sophisticated 
analysis methods have been shown to successfully identify true alerts, and at the same 
time marginally reduce false alerts. However, the systems that implemented these 
methods take the input alerts directly from the IDS sensor’s database or log file. As 
mentioned before, these raw alerts data quality is low, since the accuracy of the alerts is 
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unknown, the alerts lack contextual information, and the formats are not standardized. 
Without proper preparation such as verification, enrichment, or standardization performed 
before the analysis, the algorithms that process the alerts need to increase its complexity, 
i.e. to filter false alerts, while at the same time performing the analysis. As a result, 
perhaps effectiveness of the analysis methods and accuracy of the final analysis result are 
affected.  
 
As a quick solution, some systems implement simple preparation, either verification 
or standardization within their system before the particular analysis method is performed. 
This practice might improve the accuracy of the final analysis results but as it is not the 
main focus of the system, the verification or standardization capability might be limited and 
just suitable to be used within the systems. In other scenario, since there is no alert quality 
management framework available to guide high-level alert analysis, some of the systems 
at this level just process the raw alerts directly. Others cannot afford to slot in the 
preparation process due to commitment to the primary technique implemented. Thus, to 
help these high-level alert analysis systems reduce complexity, increase effectiveness, 
and produce more accurate results, a properly planned low-level alert preparation 
framework that focuses on verifying, enriching, and standardizing IDS alerts is proposed.    
 
In short, this problem statement highlights the current low data quality issue during 
the production and analysis levels. Observing this issue from the data quality management 
practice, we believe that the complexity at high-level alert analysis stage can be reduced if 
the input alerts are well-prepared by properly enriching the alerts with contextual 
information for verification. We identified a gap between the low-level and the high-level 
stage, where the verification, enrichment, and standardization process may be performed. 
Figure 1.1 shows the alert data quality problem overview during the production and the 
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analysis level. The figure also illustrates the existing process elements and flow while the 
gap where our problem statement is located is shown by the dashed shaded box. 
1.3 Proposed Solution: Implementing Intrusion Alert Quality Framework  
In this thesis, we propose a solution to address the low data quality IDS alerts 
problem discussed in Section 1.2 above. The research conducted is to prove the 
hypothesis that the low data quality alerts can be improved by applying data quality 
management towards IDS alerts at low-level alert preparation stage. Thus, the two 
objectives of this research are:   
 
IDS Sensor
Purpose : Detect intrusion events 
Current Problem : 
• Signature rules are too general
High-level Alert Analysis 
Current Problems :
• Process raw alerts directly
• Some do alert preparation 
(verify/tag/standardize) within the system
Raw Alert Database
Current Problems :
• Usually very large in volume
• Low data quality i.e. contains 
false and non-standardized alerts  
• Need a framework to manage 
the data quality of IDS alerts. 
IDS Alerts Production and Analysis Flow
 
Figure 1.1:  Alert data quality problem overview during production and analysis level. 
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1. To design Intrusion Alert Quality Framework (IAQF) that verifies alert accuracy, 
enriches alerts with contextual information, and standardizes alert format.  
2. To implement prototype of IAQF to show the effectiveness and accuracy of the verified 
and enriched alerts in helping to reduce false alerts at the analysis stage. 
 
1.3.1 Scope 
This thesis focuses on solving the low data quality alert problem. Thus, we 
concentrate on designing the proper low-level alert preparation of intrusion alert analysis. 
We leave the high-level alert analysis (correlation, machine learning, or data mining) to 
perform their specific algorithms and techniques to achieve their individual goal (identify 
true alerts, analyze, understand, or build attack scenario). Later, these systems have the 
option to take the output (high data quality alerts) of our low-level alert preparation as their 
input to indirectly help them produce more accurate analysis. Figure 1.1 has shown the 
problem overview and research scope where the grey box illustrates our contribution area.  
 
There are some areas that we did not focus on, like the alerts collection 
mechanism, the contextual (system or network) information gathering tools, the 
vulnerabilities information storing, and the standardization data format. However, these 
elements are closely related and directly used in the prototype system to support our 
framework. The existing techniques are used to collect the alerts from the sensors, to 
actively and passively scan the network to gather hosts profiles, and to gather 
vulnerabilities information from vulnerability resources such as Snort signature 
documentation (Snort, 2007), CERT (CERT, 2007) and CVE Mitre (CVE, 2007). Finally, 
the existing IDMEF standard is used for normalizing the alerts and enriching them with 
data quality assessment information. 
 
 7
1.4 Main Contribution 
The main contributions of this research are: 
1. Verifying alert accuracy using defined data quality parameters. 
2. Enriching alerts with measured data quality scores to prepare them for true and false 
alert classification at the high-level alert analysis stage. 
3. Standardizing the enriched alerts using IDMEF standard format to be flexibly used by 
any high-level alert analysis. 
 
The contributions of this thesis in relation to the existing works in the area of IDS 
false alerts reduction and data quality are presented in Figure 1.2. The focused area and 
related works are briefly explained in Chapter 2 to provide background and literature 
review for this thesis. 
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Existing Sensor Level Approach 
to Reduce False Alert
IDS Alert Production and Analysis
Existing Low-level Alert Preparation
Proposed in this thesis:
Existing High-level Alert Analysis
Correlation (Valdes and Skinner, 2001)
Aggregation (Debar and Wespi, 2001)
Data Mining (Lee et al., 1999)
Attack Scenario Building
(Ning et al., 2002)
Alert Tagging
(Porras et al., 2002)
Alert Verification
(Kruegel and Robertson, 2004)
Intrusion Alert Quality Framework 
(IAQF) 
Contributions/Features:
- Verify alert correctness
- Enrich alerts with measured 
data quality scores 
- Normalize alerts using IDMEF 
standard format
Signature Update (Ranum, 2003)
Rules Optimization 
(Norton and Roelker, 2004)
Existing Data Quality model
Data Quality (Wang et al., 2001) 
Existing Data Quality implementation
Improving Data Warehouse and 
Business Information Quality
(English, 1999) 
Existing Low-level Data Preparation method
Data Preparation for Data Mining 
(Pyle, 1999) 
Existing Data Quality categories
Apply
Data Quality is the Cornerstone of 
Effective BI (Brauer, 2001) 
Data Quality in Context 
(Strong et al., 1997) 
Healthcare Data Warehouse and 
Quality Assurance
(Berndt et al., 2001) 
Quality-Driven Query Answering for
Integrated Information Systems
(Naumann, 2002) 
Machine Learning
(Pietraszek, 2004)
 
Figure 1.2:  The relation of the thesis contributions to the IDS analysis and the 
data quality domain. 
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1.5 Terminology 
In this thesis, we use terminologies that may have different meaning in other areas 
of studies. Thus, the explanations about the terminologies used are depicted below: 
 
Security Alert refers to alarm, log or warning report triggered by signature-based IDS 
sensor when monitored network packet matches sensor’s attack signature 
 
False alert refers to inaccurate alerts such as false positive and noises generated by IDS. 
 
True alert refers to accurate alerts that matched all the conditions for the attack events to 
be successful.  
 
Low-level alert preparation refers to the stage where the alerts are verified and enriched 
using additional contextual information and standardized to prepare the alerts. 
   
High-level alert analysis refers to the stage where the alerts are processed using 
sophisticated algorithm such as correlation, aggregation, data mining, or machine 
learning for false alert reduction, analysis and security decision making.  
 
Low data quality refers to inaccurate or false data. This group of data receives low data 
quality scores when measured using predefined data quality parameters.  
 
High data quality refers to alerts that are verified to be accurate (true) and receive high 
data quality scores when measured using predefined data quality parameters. The 
alerts are enriched with data quality information and standardized. 
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Data Quality Parameter refers to data quality criteria defined to measure the accuracy of 
the alerts generated by IDS and meet the high-level alert analysis needs.  
  
Data Quality Score refers to data quality assessment scores measured using predefined 
data quality parameters, rules, and weights. 
 
Supporting contextual information refers to information that reflect real life conditions of 
the alert attributes during the attack events, such as vulnerabilities that are going to 
be affected by the events as well as the hosts’ and sensors’ profiles in the network 
where the alerts are triggered.    
 
Precision refers to fraction of the previously known false alerts which has been classified 
into false alert group. 
 
Recall refers to fraction of the classified false alerts which has been known as false alerts.  
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of six chapters. In this chapter, motivation, problem statement, 
objectives, scope, and main contributions of this research are highlighted. In Chapter 2, 
research background and related works are briefly elaborated. The background thoroughly 
explains two major areas involved in this research. They are IDS alert analysis and data 
quality management. The related works are three levels of existing approach to solve false 
alert problems; sensor level, preparation level, and analysis level. We focus on highlighting 
two implementations at the alert preparation level: alert verification and alert tagging. 
These are the works closest to our framework implementation. 
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Chapter 3 explains in detail the design and architecture of the proposed solution, 
IAQF. We identify two distinct stages of intrusion alert analysis: low-level alert preparation 
and high-level alert analysis. The IAQF that applies data quality management is 
implemented at the low-level data preparation stage and prepare alerts for high-level alert 
analysis stage. The rest of the chapter covers the detail explanation about the framework 
components and potential benefits of the approach towards intrusion alert analysis. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the sample prototype implementation of the proposed IAQF. 
Every component of IAQF, pseudocodes, and sample of alert data quality scores 
measurements are presented. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the experiments conducted in three case studies, the reduction 
and scalability results, the results validation, and the evaluation of IAQF effectiveness and 
accuracy. Three datasets were tested: DARPA 2000, CS USM real LAN, and HoneyNet 
network traffic.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis, reviews the objectives, discusses the 
potential benefits of IAQF, and finally provides the future works to improve the prototype 
system.         
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, background for every domains related to this research are 
reviewed. This research merges two separate domains, data quality from information 
management area and intrusion detection from ICT security area. To review ICT security 
area, where this research belonged, we further discuss the IDS’s false alert problem and 
critically analyze the existing solutions for the problem. We also explain the data quality 
fundamental concept and model to be used in our approach to solve the IDS problem. 
 
Section 2.2 discusses the IDS and the false alert problem. While Section 2.3 details 
out the current solutions for the problem, Section 2.4 briefly explains data quality field and 
model applied in this research to solve the false alert problem. Finally, Section 2.5 
summarizes the chapter.  
 
2.2 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
Intrusion detection is one of ICT security processes executed in a cycle. ICT 
security is defined as “the process of maintaining an acceptable level of perceived risk” 
(Bejtlich, 2004). This definition reveals that security is an on going process and not only a 
one-time action. The ICT security process cycle include four processes; assessment, 
protection, detection, and response process. First, the assessment process covers the 
policy setting, budgeting, and managing the security implementation. Second, the 
protection process applies countermeasures to limit the number of attack occurred. Next, 
detection is the process of analyzing incidents and finally, the response is the recovery 
steps that are performed after attack occurred (Bejtlich, 2004).  
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The thesis concentrates on the detection process, or intrusion detection. The 
intrusion detection is defined as “the process of identifying and responding to malicious 
activity targeting at computing and network resources” (Amoroso, 1999). Typical enterprise 
security systems implement defense-in-depth strategy where security devices such as 
packet filtering routers, stateful firewall, proxy firewall, and IDS are deployed in various 
strategic locations in the network infrastructure to detect intrusions. Those security devices 
act as sensors that silently monitor network packets and generate alerts or produce logs 
when suspicious packets are seen (Northcutt et al.,2003).  
 
There are two types of IDS sensor: network-based (NIDS) and host-based (HIDS) 
sensor. NIDS monitors all traffic in the monitored network while HIDS monitors the host’s 
related security information such as application logs, system activities, and file system 
modification logs. There are also two types of IDS detection mechanisms: signature-based 
and anomaly-based detections. Signature-based IDS compares pattern in the monitored 
network packets with a list of attack patterns (signatures) used by the sensors, while 
anomaly-based IDS monitors system activities and classify them as normal or anomalous. 
The classification is based on the normal activities monitored by the sensor within 
specified time duration as the sensor’s learning process prior to the real monitoring usage. 
 
Table 2.1 shows the overview or roadmap of researches that have been done thus 
far in ICT security area (School of Computer Sciences, USM, 2005). The area covered by 
our study, log/alert analysis to reduce false alert is highlighted by the dotted-circle. This 
highlight is to show in which area our research contributes to the ICT security domain in 
general. As this section explains and shows where our contribution is located in the 
context of ICT security, the next section further elaborates the problem statement 
previously stated in Chapter 1.  
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Table 2.1: Roadmap of researches that have been done in ICT security area 
(School of Computer Sciences, USM, 2005). 
SPECIFIC 
APPLICATION 
ORIENTED 
 
TRUST CONFIDENTIALITY ABUSE ANALYSIS 
Enterprise -Digital 
Signature 
-Public key 
infrastructure 
-Enterprise level 
security 
-Agent-Server 
Security 
-Radius/Karberos 
-Honeypot/Honeynet 
-Man-in-the-
Middle (MIM) 
-DoS/DDoS 
-Virus/Worm, 
Spam 
-Drone Armies 
-Forensics 
-Enterprise 
Audit 
-Enterprise 
PenTest 
Applications -Biometrics 
-Smart Card 
-One time 
password 
-Database security 
-Web-based 
Application Security 
-SSL, SSH 
-Buffer Overflow 
-Format String 
-Client-side 
(XST,XSS) 
-SQL injection 
-Phising 
-Appl. Forensics 
-Appl. Audit 
-Appl. Pentest 
 
Data -Authentication 
-Non-
repudiation 
-Integrity 
-Tripwire 
 
 
-Cryptography 
(inc. encryption, 
braid) 
-steganography 
-parallelising crypto 
operations 
-video/image security
-Packet 
Spoofing 
-Cryptanalysis 
-Brute force 
-ISN Predictions 
-Cache 
Poisoning 
-Data Forensics 
-Log/Alert 
Analysis 
-False Positive 
Reduction 
OS 
Drivers 
Registeries 
Interface 
-Network 
security 
-Mobile Ipv6 
security 
-Tunneling 
-IPSec 
-VPN 
-Firewall 
-Intrusion Prevention 
-Trusted OS 
-Rootkit 
-Trojan horse 
-OS 
Fingerprinting 
-Sniffing 
-Hijacking 
-Rerouting 
-OS Forensics 
-OS PenTest 
-Intrusion 
Detection 
 PROTECTION   
 
 
 
2.2.1 False Alerts Generated by IDS Sensor 
This research looks at the false alert problem faced by IDS. To better understand 
the problem, we classify alerts into false and true categories. True alert is defined by 
(Ranum, 2003) as “an alarm that identifies a system that has just been successfully 
attacked” whereas according to (Timm, 2001), false alerts can be any of the divisions 
depicted here: 
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 Reactionary traffic alerts; triggered because sensors see a lot of destination 
unreachable packets as a result of hardware failure 
 Equipment-related alerts; triggered by load balancer when sensors see unrecognized 
packets generated by network devices  
 Protocol violations; triggered because of bugs in software or applications 
 True false positives (benign trigger); triggered when sensors make mistake and 
wrongly interpret a non-malicious event as an attack since it matches the signatures  
 Non malicious alarms (noise); triggered when sensors do not make mistake and 
correctly trigger alert as such intrusion occurred and match the signature but the target 
hosts are not vulnerable to the attack 
 
Note that the term “alarm” and “alert” are synonymous and used interchangeably in 
security field.  
 
As mentioned in problem statement in Chapter 1, false alerts exist in any IDS 
especially signature-based because of signature rules that are too general in an attempt to 
avoid false negative. Realizing that this problem in any IDS (especially signature-based 
IDS) is unavoidable, a lot of solutions have been proposed and implemented to eliminate 
or at least reduce the amount of false alerts so that true alerts can be interpreted 
accurately by security analysts manually, or with the help of high-level analysis. The 
existing solutions to handle this false alert problem are explained in the following section. 
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2.3 Current Solutions for Low Data Quality Alert Problems 
The existing solutions to address the low data quality alert problem (especially false 
alert) in intrusion detection area can be classified into three levels: sensor-level, low-level 
alert preparation, and high-level alert analysis. We discuss each level in the following 
subsections and concentrate more on current methods used at low-level alert preparations 
since here is where our solution is implemented. Figure 2.1 below shows the existing three 
levels solutions and highlights where our contribution fit in.  
 
2.3.1 Sensor Level  
The first solution to false alert problem is alert reduction at the sensor level. At this 
level, any or combination of these solutions have been used to improve the sensors’ 
intrusion detection mechanism: 
 Tuning sensors’ signatures (Ranum, 2003) 
 Frequently updating sensor rules (Norton and Roelker, 2004)  
The above approaches may help decrease the volume of alerts, avoid data explosion, and 
indirectly improve sensors’ output as the reliability and sensitivity of the sensors are 
increased. By implementing the above solutions, only specific alerts are generated since 
 
Alert Preparation
• Alert Tagging
• Alert Verification
• Alert Format 
Standardization
Sensor Level
• Rule 
optimization
• Signature 
update
Alert Analysis
• Aggregation
•Correlation
• Data Mining
• Machine Learning
Currently combined in a system
IAQF is implemented at this level
Figure 2.1: Existing solutions for false alert and low data quality alert 
problems in intrusion detection. 
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some of the signatures are being turned off. From security analysts point of view, this level 
of solution is sufficient and helps them a lot in reducing their burden to interpret the alerts 
since the amount to be analyzed are lessen and irrelevant data are marginally discarded. 
However, in reality, those solutions are still far from ideal and only act as a short term 
basic solution in security implementation. Since the network is dynamic and continuously 
changing from time to time, the tuning also needs to be done every time the network 
changes. These solutions, most of the time need to be combined with high-level solutions 
that have broader view of the alert context and not only depends on the reliability and the 
sensitivity of the sensor. Normally, the alerts still need to be further analyzed, mined, 
correlated, and filtered to identify the true alerts among the remaining false alerts. The 
sensor itself can also further improve the alerts by taking into consideration the supporting 
contextual information available, gathered from the network.   
  
2.3.2 Low-level Alert Preparation  
The second level of solution to low data quality alerts problem is at low-level alert 
preparation stage. At this level, currently, there are several methods implemented to 
address low data quality alerts: alert verification, alert tagging, and alert standardization. 
These alert preparation methods are the existing implemented solutions closest to our 
work. These approaches take the low data quality alerts collected from the sensor and 
prepare the alerts for high-level analysis. So far, these approaches have been combined in 
the analysis systems itself (referring to Figure 2.1). 
 
Data preparation such as data enhancement and enrichment at the lower-level has 
been proven to benefit high-level data analysis method like data mining (Pyle, 1999). Our 
survey towards several analysis systems also shows that almost all of these systems 
implement alert preparation methods (either alert verification, alert tagging, or alert 
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standardization) before they implement their core analysis methods (correlation, 
aggregation or data mining). Table 2.2 shows the alert preparation methods implemented 
as well as their benefits for high-level alert analysis. This survey shows that alert 
preparation is generally needed prior to the high-level analysis techniques. One of the 
surveyed techniques, the machine learning process, did not implement any alert 
preparation (refer to the last row of Table 2.2), hence the complexity of the machine 
learning process is high (Pietraszek, 2004). The level of complexity might be able to be 
reduced if the alert preparation was implemented prior to the main process. 
 
Alert Tagging  
The first low-level data preparation is tagging. This approach was implemented by 
a particular high-level analysis called M-Correlator (Porras et al., 2002). Alerts are tagged 
with calculated relevancy score; the attributes are OS type and version, hardware type, 
service suite, enabled network service, and application. After the alerts are tagged, they 
are ranked into priority levels at the initial stage of their correlation system. This method 
has been shown to improve the system’s detection rate. This improvement proves that 
low-level preparation system is indeed needed before high-level analysis methods are 
being executed.  
 
This alert score measurement is very close to our data quality measurement 
technique. However, our measurement implementation is part of the IAQF that implement 
data quality model called TDQM. The advantage of using this model is that the parameters 
to determine the data quality scores can be redefined, added, or removed. The IAQF is 
also expandable and flexible for any of the analysis system. 
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Table 2.2: Data preparation methods implemented in high-level alert analysis systems. 
 
High-level Alert 
Analysis Systems 
Data Preparation Method Benefits 
 ACC (Debar and 
Wespi, 2001) 
 
Associates each alert with a 
confidence value according to 
intrinsic and relative inaccuracy 
factors. 
Identifies accuracy. 
EMERALD 
(Porras and Neumann, 
1997) 
 
Normalizes alerts using generic 
resource object. 
Provide operating parameters 
for analysis targets definition, 
reusability and configuration 
tuning. 
M-Correlator 
(Porras et al.,2002) 
 
Alert tagging where relevancy 
and priority of the alerts are 
scored and tagged. 
Measure relevancy and priority 
of the input alerts. 
Fusing a 
Heterogeneous Alert 
Stream into Scenarios 
(Dain and Cunningham, 
2001) 
Normalizes alert using standard 
format. 
Easily accessed by fusion 
system. 
TIAA (Ning et al., 2002) Resolves naming inconsistencies. Easily accessed by alert 
correlation.  
CRIM, MIRADOR 
(Cuppens, 2001) 
Normalizes using IDMEF format.  Easily accessed by clustering 
function. 
A Data Mining 
Framework for Building 
Intrusion Detection 
Models (Lee et al., 
1999) 
Computes accurate models from 
very large amount of input data 
using learning agents and classify 
the input data using detection 
agent. 
 
Lightweight detection where the 
heavy tasks are processed by 
learning agents.  
Comprehensive 
Approach to Intrusion 
Detection Alert 
Correlation (Valeur et 
al. 2004) 
Alert verification and tagging by 
determining the success of the 
intrusion attempt. 
The verification prepares the 
data for the correlation with 
success information.  
Machine Learning 
(Pietraszek, 2004) 
Not implemented. Increase complexity of the 
machine learning 
  
Alert Verification 
 The second method implemented at low-level alert preparation stage is verification. 
This approach verifies IDS alerts by integrating them with contextual or supporting 
information collected from network or system environment where the alerts are triggered. 
There are three types of network or system information gathering techniques: passive 
scanning, active scanning, and post-attack verification techniques.  
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First, using passive scanning, the system and network information such as running 
OS and running services are gathered by monitoring the network silently without sending 
any packets to the network. An example of a product that implements this passive 
scanning technique is Passive Vulnerability Scanner (PVS) (Tenable Network Security, 
2007). 
    
The second type of contextual information gathering technique is the active 
scanning. Usually, this technique is done at regular interval from time to time. These 
gathered information are stored in a database form time to time and are available during 
the alert analysis. Nmap (Insecure.org, 2007) is an example of a security scanner that 
uses the active scanning method.  
 
The third type of information gathering and context integration is the post-attack 
verification. This technique investigates target hosts to discover forensic traces and 
evidence after alerts are generated. These evidences are used to support the hypothesis 
of whether the alerts were successful or not. This verification system was implemented by 
(Kruegel and Robertson, 2004) and aimed at determining alert success status by 
considering real-time network information. The alerts are marked with “successful”, 
“unsuccessful”, and “undetermined” tags.  
 
Active and passive scanning, each has its constraints and accuracy issues. Thus, 
the best solution for the time being is to combine both techniques as implemented by RNA 
(Real-time Network Awareness) (Shenk and Shackleford, 2007), a commercial tools from 
Sourcefire. RNA is built to fulfill the need of system and network intelligence to make 
security analysts aware of what systems they are currently protecting. This real-time 
knowledge about the systems plugged in and out of the network is highly important to 
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analyze IDS alerts since it will determine whether the alerts are true or false. Some of the 
alert supporting information that can be gathered using RNA are OS and host’s alive status 
using passive discovery, opened ports using active discovery, anomaly detection, and host 
criticality information.  
 
In this research, we also test our proposed framework in real network using 
combination of the active and passive scanning. The active scanning was done using 
Nmap while the passive scanning was performed using p0f (Zalewski, 2006) and PADS 
(Shelton, 2005). P0f was used to do real time OS fingerprinting while PADS was used to 
detect hosts that exists in the network as well as the running services.  
 
Alert Format Standardization  
Besides tagging and verification, another preparation method is format 
standardization. The format agreed by the security community is used to standardize the 
alerts coming from heterogeneous security data sources.  The alerts are standardized prior 
to being processed by the high-level analysis such as correlation and aggregation. It is an 
attempt to solve part of low data quality issue which is the non-standardized alerts or logs 
produced by different IDS vendors. There have been several formats proposed by the 
intrusion detection community such as IDMEF (Debar et al., 2006) and CIDF (Staniford-
Chen et al., 1998) where each format is designed for different purposes. Without a 
common format agreed upon, effective efforts to aggregate and correlate logs or alerts can 
be a daunting task. 
 
IDMEF was introduced by Debar et al. (2006) as a standard data format to present 
alerts generated by IDS. Figure 2.2 shows the simplified version of the IDMEF model (work 
in progress) as of September 17, 2006. The purpose of this data model is to provide a 
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standard representation of the alerts (simple or complex) reported by IDS. An example of 
an analysis system that implements IDMEF within the system to normalize it’s raw alerts 
input collected from IDS sensors is CRIM of MIRADOR project (Cuppens, 2001) (refer 
Table 2.2).  
 
 
IDMEF-Message
Heartbeat
AnalyzerTime
DetectTime
CreateTime
Analyzer
Source
Target
CorrelationAlertOverflowAlertToolAlert
Alert
Classification
Assessment
AdditionalData
CreateTime
Analyzer
AdditionalData
 
 
Figure 2.2: A simplified version of the IDMEF model (work in progress) as 
of September 17, 2006 
. 
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IDMEF has several strong points that can be exploited to solve alerts 
standardization and matching issues. IDMEF data model addresses several IDS alert 
representation problems that are: 
 
 Heterogeneous alert information; the object-oriented implementation is extensible and 
flexible enough to cater alerts with simple or detail information. 
 Different IDS environments; there are support classes that handle varieties of data 
sources such as detection based on network traffic, OS logs or audit data etc.  
 Different sensors capabilities (lightweight or complex); extensions can be done using 
subclassing or association of new classes.   
 Different operating environments (network or OS used); subclasses can be used to 
add additional attributes to accommodate different characteristics of reported attacks. 
 Different commercial vendor’s objectives; the object-oriented inherent features takes 
care of this problem. (Debar et al., 2006) 
 
 Another data model called M2D2 was proposed by Morin et al. (2002). M2D2 is 
formally defined to model relevant data for alert correlation. The model includes four types 
of information: information system characteristics, vulnerabilities, security tools, and alert 
events. The model is quite comprehensive and able to enrich IDMEF formatted alerts with 
this information. However, the model only intends to provide the four types of information 
and is not extensible; the data quality assessment of the alerts has not been planned to be 
included. Thus, our framework may be implemented on top of the model to further verify 
and enrich the alerts with data quality information (in the form of data quality assessment 
scores).      
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2.3.3 High-level Alert Analysis  
After explaining the two levels of false alert solution (sensor level and low-level 
alert preparation), we finally describe the third level of false alert solution that is the high-
level alert analysis (refer Figure 2.1). Since IDS normally produces thousands of alerts per 
day, it is difficult to analyze the alerts manually. Therefore, at this level, methods such as 
correlation, aggregation, data mining or machine learning are used to better understand 
attack scenario and at the same time filter or reduce false alerts.  
 
There have been a lot of high-level analysis systems developed (refer Table 2.2). 
The alerts aggregation and correlation techniques were implemented by IBM (Debar and 
Wespi, 2001) to find duplicates and group alerts according to predefined criteria. Lee et al. 
(1999) uses data mining to classify and correlate alerts while SRI International (Porras et 
al., 2002) used probabilistic method to develop EMERALD that parse, filter, format, 
analyze, and correlate alerts. EMERALD was then further enhanced and called M-
Correlator (refer Section 2.3.2). Another high-level alert analysis developed is an attack 
scenario builder called TIAA (Toolkit for Intrusion Alert Analysis) (Ning et al., 2004) which 
processes alerts and produces attack scenario based on prerequisite-consequence-based 
correlation method.  
 
2.3.3.1 Generic High-level Alert Analysis Procedures 
Gorton (2003) has done a survey towards the above analysis systems and 
proposed a generic procedure containing six tasks commonly accomplished by the 
systems that uses Intrusion Alert Correlation (IAC) analysis method. Figure 2.3 below 
shows the procedures. The detail about every task is elaborated in the following 
paragraphs. 
